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ABSTRACT
The current study assessed factors associated with competency to stand trial
(CST) for 134 male juvenile offenders. Written reports of each juvenile’s competency
evaluation provided data on age, educational and family background, mental health, types
of offense, and understanding of the juvenile justice system. Various differences
emerged between 10-15 and 16-18 year age groups, including behavioral and
developmental issues for younger youth, and school and substance use problems among
older youth. Psychosis, paternal presence, and understanding of court roles and
procedures differentiated the youth determined to be competent to proceed to trial versus
those who were not. To a less significant extent, educational status, developmental delay,
receipt of special services, taking medication at time of arrest and diagnosis of a mood
disorder also emerged as characteristics distinguishing competent and incompetent youth.
With respect to differences related to competency between the two age groups, ADHD
and education level were both marginally related to competency for the younger
juveniles. For the older youth, diagnoses of mood disorders were significantly
associated with competency, while developmental delays, and to a less significant extent,
psychotic disorders were associated with incompetency. Additionally, the absence of a
father in the home, no history of receiving special school services, and taking psychiatric
medication at the time of arrest were also significantly associated with competence for

the older youth. Results identify and discuss differences among younger or older
delinquent youth deemed CST, and point to next steps for research examining age in
relation to other characteristics of youth.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Competency to stand trial (“CST”; “adjudicative competence” or “competence to
proceed”) for adult defendants is a well-developed and long-standing concept in both
criminal law and forensic psychiatry and psychology, and requires that adult defendants
be able to adequately understand and participate in legal proceedings against them. For
adolescents, however, this requirement was historically considered unnecessary given the
rehabilitative ideals of the early juvenile justice system (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000; Grisso,
1997). However, as the juvenile justice system has become more punitive and adult-like
in nature over the past few decades, courts have increasingly required that juvenile
defendants must be competent to proceed to trial (In re Gault, 1967; Grisso, 2003a;
Redding & Frost, 2001).
In extending these requirements to youth, courts have often presumed and
expected that youth demonstrate legal competency in the same ways as adults and thus,
have applied the same legal standard to adolescents that was conceptualized for adults.
At best, the particular legal standard for competence in juvenile court is unsettled (Scott
& Grisso, 2005). It has become clear, however, that assessment of juvenile CST involves
complex issues beyond those addressed by the legal standard in place for adult
assessments. Of particular significance, competency among adults is often statutorily
linked to the presence of mental illness (Baranoksi, 2003; Grisso et al., 2003); in children,
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however, incompetence to stand trial can arise from immaturities in normal
developmental capacities in the absence of, as well as in conjunction with, psychiatric
disorders. In other words, because many juvenile defendants have not fully developed
their cognitive, emotional and psychological capacities, they may have impaired legal
abilities that are a direct result of their youth, rather than any identifiable mental illness or
impaired intellect. The complexity of juvenile cognitive development and competencies,
in theory and practice, make this area of forensic psychiatry and psychology particularly
challenging.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Brief History of Juvenile Justice Policy in America
Over the last century, the American legal system has experienced significant
shifts in its consideration for and treatment of child and adolescent offenders. With the
establishment of the first juvenile court in 1899, the United States adopted the then
progressive view that youth who committed criminal offenses should be treated
separately and differently from adults (Dreyer & Hart, 2008). This was based on the
assumption that youth differed from adults in at least two significant ways: 1) due to less
mature judgment, youth were less culpable for their actions; and 2) juveniles were more
amenable to treatment and rehabilitation (Scott & Grisso, 1997). Youth criminality was
largely attributed to factors beyond a child’s control, such as poor parenting and
immaturity (Scott, 2000). Consequently, the juvenile court adhered to the philosophy that
children can and should be rehabilitated for their crimes, rather than be held morally or
criminally responsible for their actions (Mack, 1909; Zimring, 1982; Teitelbaum, 1991;
Hemmens, Fritsch, & Caeti, 1999; Scott, 2000).
The focus of the juvenile justice system was rehabilitation, not punishment
(Bonnie & Grisso, 2000; Grisso, Miller & Sales, 1987). Accordingly, juvenile court
judges were given the freedom to act with the discretion of a benevolent parent and to
pursue goals that the judge believed were in the best interests of the child (Savitsky &
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Karras, 1984). Legal procedures were informal and dispositions were indeterminate
(Scott & Steinberg, 2008). Children appearing in juvenile court were often not provided
many of the legal protections of their adult counterparts, such as the right to remain
silent, notice, representation by an attorney, an adversarial hearing, and confrontation of
accusers (Grisso, 2003b). As a result, the issue of a minor’s competency to stand trial
was rarely raised (Burnett, Noblin, & Prosser, 2004).
The rehabilitative model of the juvenile court system continued without major
changes until the mid-1960s when two landmark cases, In re Gault (1967) and Kent v.
United States (1966) radically changed the premise of the juvenile justice system. The
rulings in these two cases required that juveniles should be accorded the same rights of
due process as adult criminal defendants, including the right to counsel, the right to avoid
self-incrimination, the right to challenge evidence and witnesses in court, and the right to
receive notice of the charges against them (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2000; Scott, 2000). A
perhaps unintended effect of the Kent and Gault decisions was the advent of more
adversarial approaches to juvenile proceedings, bringing them more in line with adult
criminal proceedings (Grisso, 1997). In the wake of Gault, the era of rehabilitation and
the promotion of juvenile well-being was replaced with a new era in which the primary
goals of juvenile justice courts were punishment of the offender and protection of the
public (Scott, 2000).
In the 1980s and 1990s, the juvenile justice system experienced a second wave of
reform that further altered the nature and process of juvenile court. In response to a
perceived “epidemic” of violent juvenile crime, nearly every state changed its laws to
align juvenile courts with the more punitive approach of adult courts, with the focus on
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protecting society from juvenile offenders, rather than protecting juveniles (Steinberg &
Schwartz, 2000). These included changes in state statutes that broaden, and in some
cases automatically require, transfer of jurisdiction to criminal court for juveniles at
younger ages and for a wider variety of offenses. Some states also created extended
sentences for youth who are tried in juvenile court, and have allowed juvenile court
hearings to include juries (Dreyer & Hart, 2008). In 1995, the state of Connecticut, for
example, passed legislation replacing “court advocates” with “juvenile prosecutors,”
(Connecticut P.A. 95-225) and mandating the automatic transfer to adult court of all
juvenile offenders age 14 or older who were accused of committing a serious felony
(Connecticut General Statute § 46b-127(a), 2008). Connecticut was not alone. During
the three years between 1992 and 1995, eleven states lowered the age for transfer,
twenty-four states added crimes to automatic/waiver statutes, and ten states added crimes
to judicial waiver statutes (Scott & Steinberg, 2008).
Another response to the rise in adolescent crime was an increase in the harshness
of sanctions to which juveniles were subjected. These changes stand in sharp contrast to
the public perception that juvenile courts provide lenient sentences (Dreyer & Hart,
2008). In reality, three-quarters of youth who come in contact with police are referred for
prosecution of an offense; the use of diversionary programs seems to be the exception
rather than the rule (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). In many respects, the reforms of this
period have essentially forced children to stand shoulder to shoulder with adults in the
context of the criminal justice system, especially when their cases are waived to adult
court, thus eroding the boundary between juvenile and criminal court. (Haskins &
Steinberg, 2008; Steinberg & Schwartz, 2000; Reppucci, 1999). Youth who are legal
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minors for every other purpose are adults when it comes to their criminal conduct.
Arguably, these legal changes reflect a broader societal decline in the preservation of
childhood as a unique entity in need of special protections.
Once again, however, American juvenile justice policy appears to be in a period
of transition (Steinberg, 2008). The public outcry that spurred the “get-tough” reforms of
the 1990s and early 2000s appears to have waned and state legislatures across the country
appear to be reconsidering punitive statutes enacted in the recent past. Within the past
four years, there have been several noteworthy indicators of this shift (Steinberg, 2008).
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court, in Roper v. Simmons, abolished the juvenile
death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment, emphasizing that the immaturity of
adolescents made them less culpable than adult criminals. Since that decision, several
state legislatures have repealed, or are considering repealing, statutes that impose
sentences of life without parole on juvenile murderers (Steinberg, 2008; NJDC, 2007,
2008). Some states have modified automatic transfer laws and many states have
increased funding for community-based treatment programs as alternatives to
institutional placement (Steinberg, 2008; NJDC, 2007, 2008). Furthermore, in several
states where youth under eighteen are prosecuted in adult criminal court rather than
juvenile court, effort has been made to increase the age of jurisdictional transfer to
eighteen. In fact, in 2007, Connecticut successfully passed legislation that, as of January
1, 2010, raises the jurisdictional age in juvenile court from sixteen to eighteen (Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 46b-120 (2008) as amended by section 73 of public act 07-4 of the June
special session). Finally, at least one state has enacted legislation that authorizes findings
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of incompetence to stand trial on the basis of developmental immaturity (Steinberg 2008;
NJDC, 2007).
Adjudicative Competence
Competence to Proceed in Adult Criminal Court
Since as far back as the 17th century, the criminal justice system has required that
adult defendants accused of crimes must be competent to proceed to adjudication, a
requirement that aims to protect the fairness and accuracy of legal proceedings and
defendants’ autonomous decision-making (Viljoen & Roesch, 2008; Bonnie, 1992). The
modern American legal standard for adult competence to stand trial was formally
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1960 in Dusky v. United States (“the Dusky
standard”). Under Dusky, the appropriate test for determining adult competency to stand
trial “must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him” (362 U.S. at 402
(1960)). In addition, recent case law has been interpreted to mean that defendants must
also be able to adequately reason about relevant legal decisions (Godinez v. Moran, 1993;
Grisso, 2003a). Most states adopted language directly from Dusky into their statutes
regarding adjudicative competence, though statutes vary between states with some states
(e.g., Ohio) omitting the “rational” feature and other states adding the requirement that a
defendant’s incompetence be due to “mental disease or defect.” Although each state
statutorily defines the process for the assessment of competency, the factors and the
methods for measuring abilities have not been proscribed by the courts or the legislatures,
but left to the assessors. A general consensus among evaluators is that an adult
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defendant’s CST requires an ability to 1) understand the charges he/she faces and their
potential consequences; 2) understand the roles of court personnel and legal procedures
such trials, pleas and plea-bargaining, evidence, oaths, and cross-examination; 3) weigh
possible outcomes; 4) communicate with and assist an attorney with his/her own defense;
and 5) behave appropriately and manage stress during trial (Grisso, 2000).
Competence to Proceed in Juvenile Court
Standards. Whereas competency to stand trial is an uncontroversial right for
adults, it is not so for juveniles. Juveniles who are adjudicated in criminal court must
presumably, on constitutional grounds, be held to the same legal standard of competence
as adults adjudicated in criminal court, meaning that they must be able to understand
legal proceedings, consult with counsel and have adequate decision-making capacities
(Scott & Grisso, 2005; Viljoen & Roesch, 2008; Viljoen & Wingrove, 2007). For youth
tried in juvenile court, however, the picture is less clear. The Supreme Court has never
considered whether the Constitution requires that juveniles be extended the competency
right in juvenile court and has not explicitly extended it. Despite the Supreme Court’s
silence, approximately two-thirds of American states recognize the legal concept of
adjudicative competence for juveniles, either by statute or case law, and, with the
exception of Oklahoma (G.J.I. v. State, 1989), all state courts that have considered this
issue have held that juveniles who are adjudicated in juvenile court must be competent to
proceed (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000; Wingrove, 2007). The particular legal standard for
competence in juvenile court, however, remains unsettled (Scott & Grisso, 2005; Redding
& Frost, 2001).
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Some jurisdictions have not yet established formal competence standards for
juvenile court. Of those jurisdictions that have, many have simply adopted the Dusky
standard of adult criminal court, setting a requirement that youth in juvenile court
demonstrate the same legal capacities as adults in criminal courts -- a factual
understanding, a rational understanding, and an ability to communicate with counsel (see
e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-8-102(3), 2005; Tes. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.31-.32, 2007;
In the Matter of the Welfare of D.D.N, 19981; Redding & Frost, 2001; Viljoen &
Wingrove, 2007).
Other courts, however, have attempted to establish more relaxed competence
standards in juvenile court, given the less serious penalties associated with juvenile court
proceedings (e.g., People v. Carey, 2000). One way in which courts have done this is to
require lower levels of legal capacities for adolescents than for adults, thus setting a
lower threshold for competence. For example, courts in Michigan and Ohio have held
that juveniles’ competence should be assessed by “juvenile rather than adult norms”
(People v. Carey, 2000; Ohio v. Settles, 1998). Arguably, such a standard implicitly
recognizes that juveniles inherently have less developed abilities than adults.
Researchers have proposed that another way to apply more relaxed competence standards
is to require that juveniles demonstrate a narrower set of legal capacities than that
required for adults (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000; Viljoen & Wingrove, 2007). As Scott and
Grisso (2005) emphasize, however, initiating more relaxed competence standards in
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The Court noted, “the level of competence required to permit a child’s participation in
juvenile court proceedings can be no less than the competence demanded for trial or
sentencing of an adult” 582 N.W.2d 278 at 281.
9

juvenile court is constitutionally justifiable only if the consequences of adjudication in
juvenile court are actually less severe than those in criminal court.
In addition to the issue of whether to establish a more relaxed standard of
competence within juvenile court, courts face the question of whether to allow juveniles
to be deemed incompetent on the basis of normal developmental immaturity.
Increasingly, courts as well as legislatures specifically identify cognitive or
developmental immaturity, in addition to mental illness or mental retardation, as a
legitimate basis for adjudicative incompetence in juvenile court proceedings (Grisso,
2005b). In fact, many juvenile courts appear to recognize developmental immaturity as a
basis for incompetence even without a specific legal mandate to do so (Viljoen &
Roesch, 2008; Grisso, 2005b). At least one recent study reported that neither mental
illness nor mental retardation was present in nearly one-quarter of youths found
incompetent to strand trial in juvenile court, implying that developmental immaturity was
involved instead (Baerger, Griffin, Lyons, & Simmons, 2003). Indeed, Grisso and
Quinlan (2005) reported that approximately two-thirds of the evaluators who responded
to their national survey of juvenile court clinics indicated that they sometimes
recommended to the court that youth they evaluated be adjudicated incompetent to
proceed based on developmental limitations, and one-fifth identified this as the most
common basis for recommendations of adjudicative incompetence.
Process. When it appears that a juvenile defendant may lack the necessary legal
capacities to understand and/or participate in the adjudicative process, the issue of
competence must be raised by the defense attorney, judge or prosecutor. It is unclear
exactly how commonly the issue of juvenile competence is raised. Two studies of adult
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criminal cases have found that attorneys have doubts about the competence of about 10%
of their clients, and raise this concern for only 5% of their clients (Hoge, Bonnie,
Poythress, & Monahan, 1992; Poythress, Bonnie, Hoge, Monahan, & Oberlander, 1994).
To date, there have not been any comparable studies using juvenile samples, but
anecdotal evidence suggests that evaluations to determine juvenile CST are ordered
relatively infrequently, though the number of requests for evaluations is increasing
(Grisso, 1999; Grisso & Qunilan, 2005; Redding & Frost, 2001).
Once the issue is raised, CST assessments are then ordered at the discretion of the
court. Typically the issue of competence is raised in an attempt to understand whether
mental health issues and/or developmental factors compromise the juvenile in important
ways relevant to the court proceedings the juvenile is facing. However, concerns have
been expressed that the issue of juvenile competence, as with adults, also may be
inappropriately raised to delay the trial or to obtain mental health treatment when more
direct means are not easily attainable (Barnum & Grisso, 1994; Grisso, et al., 1987;
Roesch & Golding, 1980). Obtaining treatment may be an important goal; however,
using competency evaluations to do so may have negative effects such as delaying the
trial and leading to possible stigma for the youth.
Although overuse of competency referrals is a serious concern, an equally, if not
greater, concern is the under-identification of juvenile defendants who are potentially
incompetent (Barnum & Grisso, 1994). Attorneys may be reluctant to request
competency evaluations because doing so risks prolonging the trial process, which could
result in a more time in detention while the logistics of a competency evaluation are
organized, or alternatively, could increase the chances of the juvenile accumulating
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additional charges if the youth remains in the community during the delay. An additional
reason for not requesting competency evaluations is that a ruling of incompetence may
end up leading to more severe consequences than a guilty verdict (Grisso, 1999). In
order to prevent under-identification of potentially incompetent youth, Grisso et al.
(1987) recommended that a juvenile defendant’s competence automatically be evaluated
when a youth is 12 years old or younger, has a prior diagnosis of or treatment for mental
illness or mental retardation, has intellectual deficits or a learning disability, and/or
appears to have deficits in memory, attention, or reality testing.
Once an evaluation of competence is complete, a judicial determination regarding
competence is made. Although a judge makes the final determination, research with both
adult defendants (Zapf, Hubbard, Cooper, Wheeles, & Ronan, 2004) and adolescent
defendants (Kruh, Sullivan, Ellis, Lexcen & McClellan, 2006) has indicated that courts
overwhelmingly defer to the opinions of mental health professionals in the vast majority
of cases. As with adult defendants, relatively few youth (14-18%) who are referred for
competence evaluations are found incompetent (Cowden & McKee, 1995; McKee, 1998;
McKee & Shea, 1999).
The assessment of juvenile adjudicative competency involves evaluation of the
same types of competence-related legal abilities as must be demonstrated by adult
defendants, but it must be done within a developmental framework that necessarily raises
questions of baseline expectations and comparative abilities. For example, how does a
typical twelve year-old child’s understanding of the consequences of a plea bargain offer
compare to an adult’s understanding? How does it compare to a fifteen year-old’s? Are
the differences significant enough to necessitate a separate legal competence standard
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with different criteria for juveniles than for adults or can the Dusky standard, as currently
formulated for adults, accommodate the differences and result in developmentally
appropriate recommendations? Similarly, do developmental differences between adults
and children require different and greater assessment tools designed specially to address
issues of cognitive immaturity? Research indicates that clinicians conducting juvenile
competency evaluations use techniques similar to those employed in adult CST
evaluations, and largely view as essential for inclusion in competency evaluations the
same elements as practitioners conducting adult competency evaluations (Ryba, Cooper,
& Zapf, 2003). The data from juvenile CST evaluations are an invaluable resource for
answering such questions.
Legal Capacities of Juveniles
Child Development and Juvenile Adjudicative Competence
Juveniles’ immature developmental status presents an additional set of
complications in competency determinations. Children mature at different rates and
typically exhibit developmental spurts, delays, and transient regressions. Within the
context of normal child development, children may have difficulty transferring abilities
from one social context to another. They may exhibit some abilities without retaining
them, or retain only fragments of the abilities until full development occurs later. Stress
and emotional limitations may interfere with their capacity to apply newly acquired
abilities at relevant times (Grisso, 1998). These sorts of typical developmental issues
most probably impact adjudicative competence. Indeed, there is a significant body of
research to suggest that youth lack some of the capacities required for adjudicative
competency as a direct result of youth and normal developmental immaturity, as opposed
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to any identifiable mental illness, cognitive disability or retardation (e.g.s., Grisso et al.,
2003; Cauffman, Woolard, & Reppucci, 1999; Grisso, 1997, Steinberg & Cauffman,
2000; see generally Grisso & Schwartz, 2000). This is consistent with the substantial
number of studies showing age-related differences in juveniles’ competence-related
abilities (e.g., D. K. Cooper, 1997; Grisso et al., 2003; Warren, Aaron, Ryan, Chauhan, &
DuVal, 2003).
Studies on adolescent adjudicative competence have incorporated a wide range of
samples, including non-delinquent youth only (see e.g., Dreyer & Hart, 2008); a
combination of youth from both within and outside the juvenile justice system ( e.g.,
Grisso et al., 2003), youth referred for competence evaluations (e.g., McKee, 1998;
McKee & Shea, 1999), youth adjudicated incompetent to proceed (e.g., McGaha, Otto,
McClaren, & Petrila, 2001), and psychiatrically hospitalized youth (e.g., Warren et al.,
2003). Collectively, the research has convincingly demonstrated that adolescents,
especially young and pre-adolescents, have high rates of deficits in legal competencerelated skills in comparison to older adolescents and adults, and that court-related
functioning is consistently associated with the age of the juvenile, with older juveniles
generally demonstrating more complete understanding, reasoning and appreciation
abilities (Boyd, 1999; Burnett et al., 2004; D. K. Cooper, 1997; Savitsky & Karras, 1984;
Viljoen & Roesch, 2005; Warren et al., 2003; Baerger, Griffin, Lyons, & Simmons, 2003;
Cowden & McKee, 1995; Grisso et al., 2003; Ficke, Hart & Deardorff, 2006; McKee,
1998; McKee & Shea, 1999). This finding is not surprising. Age trends in legal
knowledge have been documented in related contexts, such as research on child
testamentary capacity (see Grisso, 2000) and children’s ability to understand and
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appreciate Miranda warnings (Grisso, 1980), and generally finds support in literature on
child development (Grisso, 1997). The body of research documenting the relationship
between youth and deficits in legal capabilities seems difficult to reconcile with the legal
presumption that juvenile defendants, like adult defendants, are competent to proceed
with trial unless and until defense counsel overcomes the burden of proving otherwise.
Collective findings indicate that, on average, a majority of adolescents under the
age of 15, as well as 15 and 16-year-olds with sub-average intellectual functioning,
demonstrate significant limitations in their ability to understand and participate in the
legal process, while most 16 to 17-year old youth typically have capacities comparable to
adults ( e.g., D. K. Cooper, 1997; Grisso et al., 2003). In the most comprehensive, multisite study examining juveniles’ legal competence-related abilities to date, Grisso and his
colleagues (2003) found that 30% of the 11 to 13 year-olds demonstrated significant
impairments in understanding of legal proceedings and/or legal reasoning, while only
19% of the 14 to 15 year-olds, and 12% of the 16 to 17 year-olds and young adults
demonstrated such limitations. Further, the 16 to 17 year-olds’ abilities did not differ
significantly from those of the young adults ages 18 to 24. Other researchers have
replicated Grisso and colleagues’ finding that age 15 represents a significant
developmental cut-off for competence-related abilities (Burnett et al., 2004; Redlich,
Silverman, & Steiner, 2003; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005; Dreyer & Hart, 2008).
Research has shown that age-related differences in legal capacities stem, in part,
from immature cognitive development (Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). In fact, some
researchers contend that age simply serves as a substitute for cognitive maturity -- the
“true” variable of interest (Ficke et al., 2006). The aspect of cognitive development that
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has received the most attention with respect to adjudicative competence is the incomplete
maturation of judgment and decision making abilities. Researchers have distinguished
between the cognitive component of these capacities – which tends to reach adult levels
by late adolescence, and the psychosocial component, which continues to develop
significantly through late adolescence (Steinberg & Cauffman, 2000; Buss, 2000).
Cognitive development refers to the increased ability to understand and process
information and is generally thought necessary for informed decision-making (Grisso,
2005a). Psychosocial development has to do with an individual’s impression or
perspective of situations and can affect one’s reactions or decisions regarding those
situations (Grisso, 2005a). Research indicates that adolescents are less developed than
adults along four key psychosocial dimensions that are particularly relevant to legal
competency: greater susceptibility to peer pressure; lower risk perception; preoccupation
with short-term over long-term consequences; and decreased capacity for selfmanagement (Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995; Reppucci, 1999; Fried & Reppucci,
2001; Haskins & Steinberg, 2008).
Specifically, research has demonstrated that youth under age 15 are less able to
evaluate risks inherent in their choices or to consider the long-term consequences of their
behavior than older adolescents and adults (Grisso et al., 2003). Further, adolescents are
generally more likely than young adults to make choices that comply with adult authority
figures, such as confessing to the police rather than remaining silent or accepting a
prosecutor’s offer of a plea agreement (Grisso et al., 2003). Young adolescents have also
been found to be more likely than older individuals to waive their legal rights, such as the
right to remain silent and the right to legal counsel (Viljoen, Klaver, & Roesch, 2005).

16

When adolescents are incompetent because of developmental immaturity, the goal
of interventions is to remediate deficits that exist because a youth is at a relatively
normal, immature stage of development, rather than to cure a temporary condition (Scott
& Grisso, 2005). Research suggests, however, that it may not be possible to accelerate
the acquisition of normal developmental capacities (Viljoen & Grisso, 2007).
Cumulatively, these findings suggest that clinicians conducting competency
evaluations should be particularly vigilant when examining the legal capacities of young
defendants, and be especially mindful of the potential impact of cognitive and
psychosocial child development on legal capacities. That being said, research indicates
that there can be considerable variability within age categories and consequently,
clinicians should not infer incompetence on the basis of young age alone (Viljoen &
Roesch, 2005).
Interestingly, despite evidence that youth may have limited legal capacities due to
normal developmental factors, it remains to be seen whether courts will recognize
adolescents’ immature developmental status as a legitimate basis for a finding of
incompetence. Currently, some jurisdictions explicitly require that incompetence be due
to mental disorders or severe cognitive deficits (Fla. Stat. Ann. §985.19(2), 2006; Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. §55.31-.32, 2007). However, at least two courts have recognized
developmental immaturity as a basis for a finding of incompetence (In re Causey, 1978;
In re Hyrum H., 2006) and at least one state has enacted legislation authorizing
adjudicative incompetence on the basis of developmental immaturity2 (Steinberg, 2008;

2

Georgia statutorily defines “mentally competent” as “having sufficient present ability to
understand the nature and objectives of the proceedings, against himself or herself, to
17

O.C.G.A. § 15-11-151, 2009). It is unclear how such legislation and court decisions
translate to widespread practice. At least one recent study reports that defense attorneys
and judges view developmental immaturity as only moderately important to juveniles’
competence and rate it as less important than mental disorders or cognitive impairments;
and relatively few judges agree that adolescents should be found incompetent on the basis
of developmental immaturity alone (Viljoen & Wingrove, 2007). Conversely, in another
recent national study, two thirds of juvenile court clinicians reported that courts in their
jurisdictions find youth incompetent on the basis of developmental immaturity, even
when there is not a formal mandate to do so (Grisso, 2005b; Grisso & Quinlan, 2005).
Psychopathology and Juvenile Adjudicative Competence
As with adults, mental health issues are strongly implicated in CST
determinations among juveniles. Mental illness and, particularly, mental retardation, are
the most common conditions underlying juveniles’ incompetence (McGaha et al., 2001).
The prevalence of mental disorders among juvenile delinquents varies from 62% - 80%
of the juvenile populations studied (Riffin, 2006; Wong, 2002; Wasserman, McReynolds,
Lucas, Fisher, & Santos, 2002; Atkins, Pumariega, & Rogers, 1999; Teplin, Abram, and
McClelland, 1998; Cowden & McKee, 1995). The rate of mental illness among this
population is much higher than among youth in the U.S. general population, where the
range is about 15% to 25% (Kazdin, 2000; Grisso, 2008). Further, about two-thirds of

comprehend his or her own situation in relation to the proceedings, and to render
assistance to the defense attorney in the preparation and presentation of his or her case in
all adjudication, disposition, or transfer hearings held pursuant to this chapter. The child's
age or immaturity may be used as the basis for determining the child's competency.”
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-151.
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youth in juvenile justice custody who meet criteria for a mental disorder meet criteria for
more than one disorder (Abram, Teplin, McClelland, Dulcan 2003; Grisso, 2008).
Features associated with mental illness more generally, such as poor self-control,
limited problem solving skills, and behavioral problems, may also evoke important
considerations in CST decisions (Kazdin, 2000). Although the presence of a mental
disorder is not sufficient in and of itself to obtain a ruling of adjudicative incompetence
(since the abilities and understanding required to stand trial must be impaired), the
disturbed processes of thinking and reasoning that accompany many mental disorders
renders mental illness one of the most common justifications for findings of adjudicative
incompetence (Grisso, 2004; Cowden & McKee, 1995).
Specific mental health factors have been found to relate to CST, legal decisionmaking and court knowledge in children to varying degrees and with varying
consistency. Research generally supports that adolescent defendants with attention
deficits and hyperactivity may be more likely than other defendants to have competence
impairments, particularly in their ability to communicate with and assist counsel (Viljoen
& Roesch, 2005). Interestingly, at least one recent study reported that a diagnosis of
Disruptive Behavior Disorders (i.e., Conduct Disorder and Oppositional Defiant
Disorder) – a diagnosis which obviously differs significantly from that of ADHD but like
ADHD is linked with behavorial disruptions -- was predictive of being found competent.
The researchers suggest this result may be due to both genuine between-group differences
and/or a diagnostic artifact in that chronic behavior problems may lead to referral for a
competence evaluation despite few true competence deficits because of pathologizing
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opinions about these youth and/or the successful prospect of obtaining services for
“problem youth.”
Research results are mixed as to whether there is an association between
adjudicative competence and broad psychological symptoms, such as depression, anxiety,
anger and irritability. Viljoen & Roesch (2005) recently reported that they did not find
such a relationship – a result that is corroborated by the findings of Grisso et al. (2003).
However, researchers have also noted that symptoms of depression, anxiety, and trauma
can be linked to impaired legal capacities in youth in less direct ways (see, Grisso,
2005b). For instance, an anxiety disorder may impair a youth’s capacity to testify and
communicate with his or her attorney, or depression may cause a youth to be
inadequately motivated to engage in his or her defense.
Severe psychopathology appears to be another important risk factor for
adjudicative incompetence (Cowden & McKee, 1995; Kruh et al., 2006; Warren et al.,
2003). Research suggests, however, that psychotic disorders, which are frequently
associated with incompetence in adult defendants (V. G. Cooper & Zapf, 2003), are a
relatively rare cause of incompetence in youth (McGaha et al., 2001). This difference is
likely because psychotic disorders often do not develop until late adolescence or early
adulthood. While severe psychopathology is an undeniable risk factor, it alone cannot
automatically be equated with incompetence, given that many youth with severe mental
disorders are found competent to stand trial (Viljoen & Roesch, 2008)
Additional Risk Factors and Juvenile Adjudicative Competence
Mental retardation and cognitive deficits are another source of adjudicative
incompetence in youth (see Grisso et al., 2003; Warren et. al, 2003). Mental retardation
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may be a particularly common cause of impaired legal capacities among adolescents
found to be incompetent (Viljoen & Grisso, 2007; Baeger, Griffin, Lyons, & Simmons,
2003; McGaha et al., 2001). Even when children do not meet criteria for mental
retardation, they may have other types of cognitive impairments, such as low IQ, learning
disabilities, and/or neuropsychological deficits in verbal abilities, abstract reasoning,
memory, attention and executive abilities, that could contribute to impaired legal
capacities (Grisso et al., 2003; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). Low IQ and deficits in verbal
ability and executive functioning are common among adolescent offenders (Moffitt,
1993).
Not surprisingly, research has consistently demonstrated a relationship between
IQ score and competence in both adult (Otto et. al, 1998) and adolescent samples
(Savisky & Karras, 1984; Cowden & McKee, 1995; D. K. Cooper, 1997; McKee & Shea,
1999; Evans, 2003; Kruh et al., 2006), with lower IQ scores associated with a
determination of incompetency. Research suggests that low intelligence may be a
particularly stronger risk factor among younger adolescents than older adolescents,
possibly because legal capacities are less ingrained at a younger age and thus more
strongly associated with cognitive ability (Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). Additionally, Ficke
and colleagues (2006) contend that both cognitive maturity and psychosocial maturity are
related to and influenced by intelligence. In a recent study focused on the cognitive
capacity of youth referred for competency evaluations, Evans (2003) reported, as
expected, that the IQ scores of those found competent were higher than of those found
incompetent. However, he also found that the Full Scale IQ scores of those youth who
were found competent were still far below the “juvenile norms” expectation of
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competency and that no clear “cut-off” score emerged as an accurate predictor of
competence, leading him to caution that, while IQ scores are important data, they should
not be considered the main factor in evaluations.
In line with studies demonstrating that cognitive impairments contribute to
impaired legal capacities, research also indicates that a history of special education is
associated with a determination of adjudicative incompetence (Cowden & McKee, 1995;
Baeger et al., 2003; Kruh et al., 2006). Similarly, average (as opposed to below average)
school grades have been shown to predict competence to stand trial (Redlich et al., 2003).
While it is commonly assumed that youth who have been previously arrested or
convicted will be knowledgeable about legal proceedings, research has not convincingly
supported this assumption. Several studies have demonstrated that prior experience with
the juvenile justice system is not significantly correlated with juvenile adjudicative
competence scores (Grisso et al., 2003; Cowden & McKee, 1998; Ficke et al., 2006;
Redlich et al., 2003), though at least one study did report that history of prior arrests was
a factor distinguishing competent from incompetent youth (McKee & Shea, 1999). At a
minimum, evaluators should be careful not to assume that youths with prior arrests or
convictions are competent. Interestingly, while prior legal knowledge is not strongly
associated with competence abilities, at least one study found that “time spent with
attorney” was a strong predictor of the legal capacities relevant to adjudication (Viljoen
& Roesch, 2005).
Prior research on the relationship, if any, between juvenile adjudicative
competence and a number of other variables including gender, race, the seriousness and
number of charges, socioeconomic status, education level, and a history of receiving
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mental health services, has largely been inconclusive and inconsistent (D. K. Cooper,
1997; Cowden & McKee, 1995; McKee, 1998; Burnett et al., 2004; Viljoen & Roesch,
2005; Grisso et al., 2003), indicating perhaps, that more research in this area is necessary.
In summary, the CST-related abilities of juveniles remain poorly understood,
particularly as they are related to other features common in juvenile offenders, such as
young age, low intellectual functioning, school failure, and history of psychiatric
disorder. These past studies concur that age is related to CST, although no clear age
cutoffs have been determined, consistent with differing rates of development throughout
childhood and adolescence (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2000). While youth under the age of
12 are generally found incompetent, older youth present a mixed picture with fourteen
representing a safer cutoff, but 15-17 year olds also demonstrating incompetence at
higher rates than adults, especially when cognitive impairments are present.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the characteristics of male juvenile
offenders in Connecticut who were assessed for CST over a two-year period, and to
examine specific mental health and developmental factors associated with the court
rulings on competency to determine whether factors previously identified emerge as most
salient when a wider array of variables are examined and when corollary education,
mental health, and law enforcement records are examined in addition to psychiatric
diagnoses made during court-ordered examinations. We expected cognitive and mental
health factors each to be implicated in differences between youth found competent and
incompetent to stand trial. Moreover, we expected different patterns of demographic,
mental health, and offense correlates between the two groups, with variables related to
developmental and behavioral deficits to emerge as critical for the younger juveniles.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Sample
The study sample consisted of 134 male child and adolescent defendants ages 1018 years who were evaluated for adjudicative competence by a university-affiliated court
clinic in Connecticut between March, 1992 and July, 2004 as a result of a court order.
The sample was divided into age groups based on both prior research regarding
adjudicative competency in youth, which generally shows that adolescents over the age
of 15 demonstrate legal competency skills similar to that of adults, while youth under age
15 do not, as well as Connecticut’s current jurisdictional age limit in juvenile court.
Connecticut requires that adolescents under sixteen years are adjudicated in the juvenile
system, while those sixteen or older are automatically tried as adults. However,
Connecticut recently passed legislation that, as of January 1, 2010, will raise the
jurisdictional age in juvenile court to eighteen (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-120 as amended
by as amended by section 73 of public act 07-4 of the June special session). The younger
group of boys was 10-15 years of age (n = 38, 28%) and the older group aged 16-18 years
(n = 96, 72%). This sample represents the male juveniles referred by 12 courts to a
university-affiliated court clinic during that time on whom we had complete data sets.
Nine females also were referred for evaluations, as were eight children under the age of
ten; these youths were not included in the analyses since there were too few cases in each
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subgroup to make any valid statistical inferences about their data. Table 1 provides a
summary of racial, educational, residential, and basic mental health characteristics of the
sample, as described in more detail in the Results section.
Variables
Variables included in this study were extracted from CST evaluation reports
prepared for the courts and from police records. Demographic variables included age,
ethnicity, with whom the child lived, the presence of a father, and the number of times
the child lived in an out-of-home placement. Developmental history was assessed in
terms of the child’s educational level (age-appropriate or delayed, and/or special
services). Mental health history variables assessed whether a psychiatric diagnosis had
been made, the specific diagnosis(es), and treatment history (active treatment,
medication, and prior hospitalization). In addition, mental health history included
assessment of alcohol and substance use history. Court and criminal charge variables
included the type of court (juvenile, GA or JD), the number of charges, the seriousness of
the charge (felony or misdemeanor), the type of crime for the most serious charge
(against person, against property, weapons, drug violation, probation violation), prior
arrests, and the type of lawyer (private or public defender). Legal competence-related
abilities were assessed in terms of each juvenile’s knowledge of his attorney’s name and
how to use his attorney, knowledge of the charges, knowledge of his attorney’s and the
prosectutor’s roles, knowledge of relevant pleas, and ability to estimate potential
consequences and tell a coherent story. Competency/Incompetency served as the study’s
dependent variable. Since evaluation recommendations were almost an exact match to
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judicial findings (only one case at variance), the assessment of competency was
determined by judicial finding.
Procedures
This study was conducted as a retrospective record review of police reports and
evaluations for CST reports that were generated by a university-affiliated court clinic and
released to the courts. Prior to the review of any records, the study was approved by the
Human Investigations Committee at Yale University and the Department of Mental
Health and Addiction Services for the state of Connecticut. The evaluations themselves
were conducted by court clinic teams that included a psychologist, social worker, and
psychiatrist, as statutorily mandated. Evaluations were conducted in three phases. First,
the team reviewed arrest reports, and spoke with the defendant’s attorney to ascertain the
reason for the CST evaluation request. Second, the defendant and a parent (or guardian)
were interviewed separately. The evaluation of the defendant consisted of a directed
interview in which the purpose and non-confidential nature of the study were explained.
The following areas related to CST were addressed in the interview: the defendant’s
understanding of a) the charges, b) seriousness of the charges, c) roles of courtroom
personnel, d) plea options and their consequences, and e) the strength of the case against
him. The defendant’s attitude toward his attorney was also assessed, with particular
focus on his level of trust of, ability to seek advice from, and ability to provide
information to his attorney. The other parts of the evaluative interview with the
defendant consisted of taking a background history, conducting a mental status
evaluation, and assessing his level of moral development. A parent interview was used to
gather information about the defendant’s developmental, educational, psychiatric,

26

substance use, and legal histories. Parents were also asked about their child’s
relationship with his attorney. Parents of defendants who had a psychiatric or substance
use history or who received special services were asked to sign a release of information
to allow the team access to those records. The last phase of the evaluation involved
reviewing school or psychiatric records, police reports if available, and writing a final
report on each defendant’s CST.
Data Analysis
Data from the evaluation reports were coded for entry into SPSS analysis.
Descriptive analysis was used to define sample characteristics. Pearson product moment
correlations and pi-serial and point bi-serial correlations were used to assess younger and
older group differences in rates of competency/incompetency. In addition, differences
between age groups were determined using chi square and t-test analyses. Since the
sample size is relatively small (n=134), findings at a significant as well as trend level of
significance will be reported.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Summary Characteristics of the Sample
Who Gets a CST Ordered?
Table 1 (see Appendix A) provides a summary of the characteristics of the
sample. The ages of the participants ranged between 10 and 18 years. The mean age of
participants in the full sample was 16 years (SD = 2.03). Racial composition of the
sample was fairly equally distributed among African American (37%), Hispanic (34%),
and Caucasian (28%) juveniles, with 2% from other ethnicities. Over three-quarters
(76%) of the youth lived with their parents, another 10% lived with extended family, and
14% lived with non-relatives. Fathers were present in the home for 41% of the youths.
However, 46% of the youth had at least one former out-of-home placement.
In terms of education, 62% of the juveniles were delayed in their progression
through school and 60% had received special services through their school at some point
in their schooling. With respect to mental health, 75% of the sample had a prior
psychiatric history and almost half (49%) of the sample had been previously hospitalized.
Independent of the CST evaluation, 68% of the juveniles had been given a formal
diagnosis at some point prior and 37% had been given multiple diagnoses. These
diagnoses included: borderline intellectual functioning or mental retardation (34%),
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (26%), other aggressive behavioral/conduct
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disorders (22%), psychotic disorders (25%), mood disorders (22%), developmental
disorders (12%), posttraumatic stress disorder (5%), and personality disorders (3%).
Some (22%) of the participants had developmental delays. A history of alcohol abuse
was reported for 38% of the sample and of other substance abuse for 54% of the sample.
Slightly less than half (46%) of the juveniles were being prescribed behavioral or
psychiatric medications and 34% were in treatment at the time of their arrest.
For What Type of Cases and Charges are CST Ordered for Juveniles?
The legal characteristics of cases for which a CST evaluation was ordered were
assessed for seriousness and types of charge. Of the entire sample, 23% were under
sixteen years of age and involved in juvenile court proceedings, and 77% were older and
being tried in adult court. Well over half (65%) of the juveniles had been arrested at least
once prior to the arrest associated with the case for which competency was being
evaluated. Twenty-four percent (24%) of the participants were charged with
misdemeanors and 76% were charged with felonies. The most serious charge for each
subject was categorized by type of crime: 1) against person (56%); 2) against property
(12%); 3) drug (15%); 4) weapon (5%); and 5) justice (12%), which involved violation
of probation, failure to appear or escape. Crimes against persons were most prevalent.
On average, the youth each had 5 charges against them in the current proceeding for
which competency was being assessed. The vast majority of the sample (85%) were
represented by public defenders, as opposed to privately retained attorneys.
The Court determined that a majority (62%) of the defendants were competent to
stand trial for their offenses.
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Comparisons among Age Groups
Table 1 shows significant differences between the older and younger age groups.
The older youth were more likely to be delayed in their educational level (p = .001) and
to have histories of alcohol (χ 2 = 13.18, p = .004) and substance abuse (χ 2 = 34.47, p =
.000). The older youth were also more likely to be represented by a private attorney as
opposed to a public defender (p = .014). These older youth tended to have had more than
one out of home placement during their life (χ 2 = 5.60, p = .061). The younger children,
on the other hand, were more likely to be receiving treatment at the time of arrest (χ 2 =
10.38, p = .001), and to have diagnoses pertaining to developmental delay (χ 2 = 4.94, p =
.026), ADHD (χ 2 = 7.02, p = .008), other aggressive behavioral/conduct disorders (χ 2 =
6.38, p = .012), developmental disorders (χ 2 = 6.96, p = .008), or PTSD (χ 2 = 4.54, p=
.033). The younger youth also were more likely to have fewer charges (t =-4.403, p =
.000) and fewer previous arrests (χ 2 = 6.17, p = .013). A weaker finding, significant at a
trend level, indicated that the younger children were somewhat more likely to have been
taking medication at the time of arrest (p = .086). The groups differed in terms of the
nature of their offense (χ 2 = 10.27, p = .036): the largest discrepancies indicated that
younger offenders were more likely to commit crimes against persons, while older youth
were more likely to commit drug-related offenses.
It is notable that age group was not related to findings of competency or
incompetency.
Comparisons of Competent versus Incompetent Juveniles
Table 2 (see Appendix B) shows competency differences among the subjects as a
total group. Incompetency was found to be significantly associated with psychotic
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disorders (p = .026) and having a father living at home (χ 2 = 3.97, p = .046). In addition,
several variables, including educational levels (delayed or appropriate) (p = .061), receipt
of special services (p=.096), presence of a developmental delay (χ 2 = 2.74, p = .098),
taking medication at time of arrest (p=.099) and mood disorders (p = .077) almost
reached significance, indicating that cognitive functioning, as determined by educational
and developmental performance, plays a role in determining competency. In terms of the
comprehension variables that are assessed to determine CST, every comprehension
variable, with the exception of knowing the attorney’s name, distinguished competent
from incompetent youth at a highly significant level.
Next, we looked at the criteria that distinguished youth found to be competent
from those found to be incompetent within each of the two age groupings (10-15 and 1618) to see if any differences emerged between the older and younger youth (see Tables 3
and 4, Appendices C and D, respectively). Several age differences were found. Mood (p
= .025) disorders, as well as no developmental delays (.017), no history of receiving
special school services (p = .029), absence of a father (χ2 = 4.06, p = .044) and taking
medication at the time of arrest (χ 2 = 4.858, p = .028) were associated with competence
to stand trial among the older youth. Also, there was a finding of psychotic (χ 2 = 3.52, p
= .061) disorder being marginally related to competency, but the actual numbers of
psychotic youth found to be competent (n = 12) versus incompetent (n = 13) is nearly
identical and a much larger sample would be needed to confirm or disconfirm this
finding, in particular. With respect to the younger juveniles, ADHD (p = .088) and
appropriate educational level (χ 2 =.357, p = .059) were associated with findings of
competence, and only at a trend level of significance.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In order to explore the role of age in relation to adjudicative competence, the
current analysis focused on comparing younger and older juveniles evaluated for CST on
characteristics relating to demography, education, mental health, offense, and
competence-related legal abilities. Both younger and older juveniles were found by a
judge to be competent more often than not. Additionally, older youth were not
determined to be competent significantly more often than were younger youth. Different
factors emerged as more highly related to CST in younger juveniles as compared to older
ones.
Age Comparisons
As predicted, behavioral and developmental factors were more salient among the
younger participants, as indicated by the higher likelihood of diagnoses of ADHD, other
aggressive behavioral/conduct disorders, developmental delays, and developmental
disorders among the younger youth. Results in the present study imply especially
problematic histories in the younger youth who were referred for CST evaluations. These
youth were more likely to have a diagnosis of PTSD and to have committed offenses
despite the increased probability of being in treatment and the somewhat increased
chance of being on medication at the time of arrest. The finding that the younger
children were somewhat more likely to be on medication at the time of arrest may be a
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by-product of the greater likelihood that the younger offenders had diagnoses of PTSD,
developmental disorders, ADHD, other aggressive behavioral disorders or developmental
delays, all of which are frequently treated with medication. The offense characteristics of
these younger youth arguably suggest an earlier criminal, and perhaps more violent,
trajectory: while they were more likely to have fewer charges leveled against them and
fewer prior arrests, disturbingly, however, they were as likely to be in court for felony
offenses as the older youth, and they were more likely to have committed crimes against
persons. These findings make sense in light of the research indicating that youth with
PTSD are susceptible to responding to threats aggressively and unexpectedly (Charney,
Deutch, Krystal, Southwick, Davis, 1993) and that youth with disruptive behavior
disorders, such as the type of conduct disorders identified in this sample, and ADHD
demonstrate substantially increased rates of physically aggressive behavior (Grisso, 2008;
Barkley, 1996).
In contrast, older youth were more likely to be educationally delayed rather than
in age appropriate grades at school – a result that is consistent with Warren et al’s (2003)
and Grisso et al’s (2003) findings of cognitive impairment and lower IQ scores,
respectively, among their samples, and which more generally is supported by research
consistently demonstrating that most youths in the juvenile justice system are below age
level in their basic educational achievements (Warren et al., 2003) and score lower on
intelligence tests than demographically comparable youth from the community (Grisso et
al., 2003). Substance abuse histories emerged as an important characteristic among the
older age group, in contrast to other kinds of behavioral disorders found among younger
arrestees. Histories of alcohol and drug abuse, and drug-related crimes significantly
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differentiated the older from younger groups in this study. This finding is not surprising
given the substantial evidence for a relation between substance use disorders and
delinquent behavior (Chassin, 2008; Grisso, 2008). In addition, the older youth were
more likely to be represented by a private attorney as opposed to a public defender, which
may be a result of having had a greater number of prior arrests and more charges, and
thus more familiarity with the penal system, as well as the added possibility of facing
greater consequences.
Competence versus Incompetence to Stand Trial
In addition to the age differences described above, differences in findings of
competency were examined among the entire sample and between the two age groups.
Presence of a father in the home stood out as an important correlate of findings of
incompetency. Interestingly, the results showed that competency was related to not
having a father living at home. The relevance of not having a father in the home to
findings of competence can only be conjectured from these data, but it raises interesting
possibilities for further examination. One supposition is that the court and/or evaluators
may assume that a paternal presence suggests the existence of authoritative parental
support which perhaps leads those decision-makers to believe that the youth’s problems
may have a more decided mental health bent than a “mere” behavioral one. In other
words, if a youth can get into trouble even while having a father (as well as a mother) in
the home, evaluators may be more inclined to question the origin and severity of the
youth’s issues, thus raising concerns regarding competency. Conversely, the absence of a
father in the home might lead evaluators to more readily assume that delinquent
behaviors are the result of problematic family dynamics and inadequate supervision
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rather than deeper mental health issues; that the youth “knew better,” but was acting out,
and consequently that he is more likely responsible for his actions and competent to
proceed to trial. It would be interesting in subsequent research to find out how the
father’s presence translates directly, if at all, to parental involvement in court
proceedings, or advocacy on behalf of the child with the court. This seemingly small
finding is interesting given the robust connection between father involvement and
reduced delinquency and aggression among youth (see Pruett, 2000). The role family
structure and involvement plays – both assumed and real -- in decisions to hold juveniles
more or less responsible for their illegal actions offers a fertile field for further study of
this vulnerable, problematic population.
A second finding that psychotic youth were more often found incompetent is
consistent with prior studies (Cowden & McKee, 1995; Kruh et al., 2006; Warren et al.,
2003), although several studies that directly compared the contributions of cognitive
deficits versus mental illness found that cognitive deficits play the larger role (McKee &
Shea, 1999; Warren et al., 2003). In particular, Cowden and McKee (1995) found that far
fewer juveniles with severe mental disorders were found competent (28%) than juveniles
with no diagnosis or with a moderate diagnosis (72% and 83%, respectively). Cowden
and McKee did not specify which disorders were considered severe, however, psychosis
would certainly have been included in that category. Studies of adult competency have
found that schizophrenia is the most common disorder among adult defendants who are
found incompetent, followed by mental retardation (Nicholson & Kugler, 1991). The
larger sample size of older adolescents in this sample may have contributed to these
findings having similarities to the findings from adult samples.
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The comprehension variables that were used to assess the youths’ understanding
of their charges and the proceedings were associated with a finding of competency at a
highly significant level, with the exception of the youths’ knowledge of their attorney’s
name, which was not significantly associated with competency. In light of the Dusky
standard and its emphasis on a defendant’s factual and rational understanding of the legal
proceedings and their consequences, this result suggests that the Dusky standard is in fact
being invoked and met in these cases. There seems to be an implicit recognition that a
youth’s familiarity with his attorney’s name, or lack thereof, is not a reflection of the
youth’s overall understanding of the proceedings or his ability to assist and make use of
his attorney. Given the number of adults that a youth in custody is likely to interact with
and the incredible amount of stress the youth is under, on the one hand, it makes sense to
not put significant weight on a youth’s ability to remember his attorney’s name. On the
other hand, however, such a variable might deserve more attention given the fact that at
least one study found that “time spent with attorney” was a strong predictor of the legal
capacities relevant to adjudication (Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). That a youth might not
know his attorney’s name does not necessarily mean that the attorney has not spent
adequate time with the youth; however, it does bring up questions regarding the nature of
the attorney-client relationship. Some research has indicated that juvenile defendants
from ethnic minority groups may have lower levels of trust in their attorneys than White
defendants (Pierce & Brodsky, 2002), and are less likely to report that they would
disclose important information to their attorneys (Viljoen et al., 2005). Given this
possibility, juvenile defendants’ relationships with their attorneys might be an especially
important area to assess.
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Educational status (delayed or appropriate), the presence or absence of a
developmental delay, whether or not a youth had received special services at school or
was taking medication at time of arrest, and a diagnosis of mood disorder all emerged as
other distinguishing characteristics related to a finding of competence, though they did so
at the trend level of significance. In the present study, a youth was somewhat more likely
to be found competent if he was in age-appropriate school level, if he did not have a
developmental delay or did not receive special services at school, if he was taking
medication at the time of arrest or if he had a diagnosis of a mood disorder. The
emergence of the first three variables – educational status, receipt of special services and
presence of a developmental delay -- is consistent with prior research that has found a
history of special education to be associated with a determination of adjudicative
incompetence (Cowden & McKee, 1995; Baeger et al., 2003; Kruh et al., 2006) and
average (as opposed to below average) school grades to predict competence (Redlich et
al., 2003). Interestingly, the results of this study were significant in the opposite direction
of many, but not all, studies. That is, many studies report that children with delayed
educational status and/or histories of special education needs are more likely to be
incompetent. In the current study, however, and consistent with the findings of Redlich
et al. (2003) and Kruh et al. (2006), the absence of these characteristics were related to a
finding of competency, as opposed to their presence being related to a finding of
incompetency. Arguably, lacking a history of either delayed educational status or receipt
of special school services may be an important historical consideration for examiners.
While it is not clear from these results exactly what delayed educational status or receipt
of special services are proxies for in terms of other developmental issues, difficulty
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succeeding in school is suggestive of cognitive difficulties, although behavior and
attitudes leading to lower school attendance may also have been implicated. Thus,
impaired cognitive capacities found in prior studies may also be linked to findings of
incompetency to stand trial in this sample.
Diagnosis of mood disorders and taking behavorial/psychiatric medication at the
time of arrest were both associated with a finding of competency at the trend level of
significance. These findings may reflect a belief by examiners that mood disorders in
juveniles, unlike other mental health disorders, do not diminish competency-related
abilities. Kruh et al. (2006) similarly found that incompetent youth were less likely to
have a diagnosis of a mood disorder and more likely to have a diagnosis of a psychotic
disorder. With respect to taking medication, examiners may assume that if a youth is
taking medication, his mental health and/or behavioral problems have already been
previously addressed and should be adequately controlled by that medication.
Consequently, examiners may presume that any delinquent behaviors that occur while on
medication must be the result of willful volition, as opposed to untreated mental health or
cognitive issues, and therefore, the youth is capable of taking responsibility for his
actions and proceeding to adjudication.
CST Differences Among Age Groups
Next, we examined differences among older and younger youth on characteristics
that differentiated competent from incompetent youth. Several significant differences
emerged. Among the younger youth, ADHD and education level were both marginally
related to competency. Interestingly, young juveniles with ADHD were more likely to be
found competent. Prior studies have likewise found ADHD is a distinguishing factor for
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adjudicative competence, however, Viljoen & Roesch (2005) reported, as perhaps would
be more commonly expected, that adolescents with ADHD are more likely, not less, to
have deficits in competence. Although a substantial proportion of the juveniles under the
age of 16 had a prior diagnosis of ADHD reported, other behavioral disorders and mental
illnesses were also prevalent. None other than ADHD, however, was associated with
competency in the younger juveniles. The most frequently occurring disorders included
aggressive behavioral disorders such as conduct disorder or oppositional defiant disorder
(37%), borderline intellectual functioning/mental retardation (32%), followed by mood
(29%) and developmental (24%) disorders. These other disorders can be quite severe in
their behavioral manifestations, and may result in symptoms that are viewed as more
clearly detrimental to competency, such as cognitive limitations or inappropriately
aggressive conduct. ADHD, however, is usually associated with fidgety behavior and
difficulty concentrating -- behaviors that affect impulsivity but may not be viewed as
impacting moral judgment in the same way. Thus, the juveniles are found accountable
despite their impulsiveness. Youth with ADHD can potentially present as unfocused, but
less dangerous and more able to speak about their crimes as compared to the young
juveniles with severe cognitive deficits or developmental delays. Educational level also
emerged as a factor somewhat related to competency for the younger youth, with younger
youth in appropriate school level being more likely to be competent, while those youth
with delayed education status were somewhat more likely to be held incompetent.
For the older youth, diagnoses of mood disorders were significantly associated
with competency, while developmental delays, and to a less significant extent, psychotic
disorders were associated with incompetency. The role of ADHD and educational delay
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among younger youth, compared to psychosis and developmental delay among older
youth possibly could be understood as one potential pathway into criminal involvement.
While we can only conjecture without longitudinal research, the developmental trajectory
from younger juvenile with a history of behavioral problems to an older juvenile
diagnosed as having specific thought disorders and identified developmental limitations,
may be associated with concurrent slippage into more criminal activity. In addition to
being older and having more time to get into legal difficulty, a greater number of charges
and prior arrests further suggest this downward slippage. The first signs of psychosis
may be evident in behaviors that are more likely to result in arrests. In addition, the
relationship of psychosis and developmental delay to incompetency among older youth
may reflect a not unexpected referral trend: older youth are more likely to be referred for
CST evaluations for reasons more similar to adults – major mental illness and/or major
developmental limitations. In light of developmental considerations, this referral trend
seems appropriate.
The presence of a father in the home, the receipt of special school services, and
taking medication at the time of arrest were all significant for the older youth in the same
manner in which they were significant for the group overall: older youth who did not
receive special services in school were more likely to be competent, as were older youth
who did not have a father at home or older youth who took psychiatric medication. If we
follow the reasoning set forth above – that older youth are referred for more severe
presentations -- the absence of a history of special services in school may indicate to
examiners that an older adolescent is not actually so impaired as to have compromised
competency abilities. With respect to a father’s presence in the home, the same reasoning
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discussed above in connection with the sample overall would apply, with even more
conviction, to the older adolescents. Namely, evaluators may assume that in a motheronly home, criminal behaviors by older adolescents are linked more readily to inadequate
supervision or the lack of an authority figure than to mental health issues or cognitive
limitations. Similarly, the fact that a youth was taking psychiatric medication at the time
of arrest may lead examiners to assume that mental health problems have been previously
identified and addressed, and thus any illegal behaviors are the consequence of poor
decisions for which the youth can and should be held responsible.
For both age groups, all of the comprehension variables, except for knowledge of
the attorney’s name, were highly significantly correlated to a finding of competency.
The Role of Age
Contrary to previous research (e.g.s., Grisso et al., 2003; Cowden & McKee,
1995), the current study did not find age to be directly associated with competency
determinations, despite significant differences found between age groups on variables
identified in previous research as important in the process of distinguishing competent
from incompetent youth. One possibility is that Connecticut is highly selective in their
referral of younger youth for CST evaluations, such that despite expectable
developmental differences across age groups, the youth have already been largely
selected out beyond that characteristic. In addition, the greater incidence of educational
delays, mental retardation, psychosis, and developmental delays among the older group
might also imply a lower functioning, more cognitively impaired group, such that typical
age-related differences are washed out. Furthermore, the small sample size of younger
youth may have obfuscated otherwise significant developmental findings. Further
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research is needed to determine why this group differs from the samples in most other
studies with respect to the role of age in competency findings.
Public Policy Implications
Based on the results of the current study, age alone is a poor measure of the
abilities juveniles require for adjudicative competency. Since many of these abilities are
also relevant to other activities regulated by the law, the current study raises important
questions about the structure of laws based on age in the United States that govern the
rights of children. For example, in the United States, adolescents are generally not
considered competent to purchase alcohol (age 21), to enter into binding contracts (age
18), to join the United States military (age 18 without parental consent), or to vote (age
18). Yet all juveniles are automatically considered competent to stand trial unless a judge
or lawyer specifically introduces the issue of potential incompetence (Baranoski, 2003).
In Connecticut, juveniles aged 14 and above are automatically transferred to adult court if
they are accused of committing a Class A or Class B felony (Conn. Gen Stat. § 46b127(a) (2008)), and according to the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers,
children are capable of managing their own representation in custody proceedings from
age twelve onwards (Dolgin, 1999; American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, 1995).
Not only does age seem be a flawed standard by which to measure competency or
maturity, but the inconsistency of our expectations of children’s capacities with respect to
age further undermines the rationality of current practices.
Along with age, mental health has traditionally been a critical component of
competency theory. Even apart from the associations between mental health and
competency that emerged, the current study paints a vivid picture of the centrality of
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mental health to juvenile defendants for whom competency evaluations are ordered.
Seventy-five percent (75%) of the current sample was found to have a psychiatric history,
with an even higher percentage among the younger group (82%). These statistics are
similar to those found in other populations of juvenile delinquents. Cowden and McKee
(1995) reported that 69% of their sample had a psychiatric diagnosis, and in other studies
80% of the youths met diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder (Teplin et al., 1998;
Kazdin, 2000). In contrast, the prevalence of mental disorders (developmental,
emotional, or behavioral) among non-delinquent children and adolescents is typically
between 15% and 25% (Kazdin, 2000; Grisso, 2008). Previous research (Teplin et al.,
1998) that assessed juvenile delinquents as a broader spectrum, rather than just
candidates for competency evaluations, suggests that the high rate of symptomatology
found in the current study is indeed what could be expected among whole populations of
juvenile delinquents.
The high prevalence of mental health issues among juvenile delinquents creates a
challenge for detention facilities. Juveniles who are detained pre-trial or post-conviction
often receive inadequate psychiatric care. One study of multiple facilities found that only
73% of detainees received a basic psychiatric screening (Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 1994). Another study found that across multiple facilities only
56% provided clinician evaluations beyond an initial entry screening (Goldstrom,
Jaiquan, Henderson, Male, & Manderscheid, 2000). The effectiveness of treatment in
these settings is not well documented, and in fact, there seems to be confusion over what
responsibility juvenile detention facilities actually have to provide treatment and what the
goals of that treatment should be (Desai et al., 2006).
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The importance of the developmental and traumatic histories of the younger
group may signal an avenue through which these children become judged to be
competent. Overall, the younger offenders referred to CST evaluations are less likely to
be functioning below their age in terms of school achievement as compared to older
delinquents; in other words, they are competent and functioning to the extent that
children their age are and do. However, when the younger children are having behavioral
impairments, then a competency determination may be viewed as valuable or necessary
to tease out the extent to which these other problems are debilitating to the child’s
capacity to accept responsibility for his illegal actions. It is possible that competency
evaluations may be requested more readily for juveniles with these types of conditions
because such symptoms can be obvious cues and easy justifications for attorneys and
judges to use when raising the competency issue. Immaturity, the other main cause of
incompetency, may escape notice frequently due to its more subtle manifestations,
particularly in adolescents.
Limitations of the Study
This study focuses on the male juvenile offender population that was referred for
CST evaluation to a university-affiliated court clinic in Connecticut during a twelve year
time span, as the overwhelming majority of CST evaluations ordered by the participating
courts were ordered on males. In fact, only seven CSTs during that time were completed
on females by the clinic at issue. This obviously leaves many questions about the
comparability and applicability of the results to a female juvenile population, an
important question given the increased female presence in the juvenile criminal system
for serious crimes. Similarly, the sample of youth under the age of 16 years old was
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substantially smaller than the sample of youth ages 16 – 18, which made comparisons
between the two age groups less reliable. Additionally, in terms of representative
samples, this study does not address the need for national scale studies on the subject of
juvenile CST to understand how the mental health needs and trends identified in
Connecticut are symptomatic of a larger problem across the country. This study also
includes all of the limitations of retrospective chart review methodology. Only the
variables available through the reports are examined in this study. Other variables of
developmental and psychiatric relevance await further study.
Future Research
Particular research attention should be paid, both in the continuation of the current
research and in future studies, to relationships between age and restorability. The current
study challenged previous research with respect to age and competency, and the reported
results should be investigated further as well as replicated in order to increase their
reliability. Restorability is an adjunct of competency that will need to be included in
subsequent studies. A greater understanding of how decisions about restorability are
made will enhance overall understanding of how courts view juveniles and what
expectations they have of them.
Future research should focus on using national samples of youth and increasing
the diversity of the participants, especially with respect to age and gender. There is still
relatively scant information on the adjudicative competency of females and youth under
the age of 14. In addition, future research on juvenile competency should include
gathering more comprehensive information about judges’ and examiners’ approaches to
each individual case. Future research should also further examine which youth get
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referred for evaluations and which ones do not, to better understand the kinds of triggers
that raise concerns for judges, attorneys and evaluators beyond cognitive impairments
and obvious psychosis. Research on CST has been slow to accumulate, but a significant
body of basic, foundational research has been established. Efforts should now be made to
broaden its scope wherever possible.
On the most general level, this study emphasizes the importance of approaching
juvenile defendants as individuals. Ultimately, there were relatively few significant
predictors of competency, which suggests that the way in which a multitude of factors,
including family background, mental health, and an individual’s developmental
trajectory, happen to align for each juvenile ends up being very important for competency
determinations. Each juvenile’s uniqueness highlights the vital role that high quality and
consistent competency evaluations play in ensuring justice.
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Appendix A
Table 1. Characteristics of the Male Sample by Age Group

Characteristic
Age
Race
African American
Hispanic
Caucasian
Other
Education
Current School Level
Delayed
Appropriate
Receipt of Special Services
Receiving services
Not receiving services
Family Structure History
Living with:
Parent(s)
Extended Family
Other
Out of Home Placements
None
One
Greater than One
Father’s Presence at Home
Father is present in home
Father not present in home
Mental Health
No Diagnosis
Multiple Diagnoses
Receiving Treatment at time
of arrest
Taking Medication
History
Psychiatric History
Prior Hospitalizations
Substance Abuse History
Alcohol Abuse History

Full Sample
n = 134
%∗ (n) or
mean (s.d.)
16.1 (2.03)

Ages 10-15
n = 38
%∗ (n) or
mean (s.d.)
13.32 (1.51)

Ages 16-18
n = 96
%∗ (n) or
mean (s.d.)
17.21 (0.72)

36.6 (49)
33.6 (45)
28.4 (38)
1.5 (2)

26.3 (10)
42.1 (16)
31.6 (12)
0.0 (0)

40.6 (39)
30.2 (29)
27.1 (26)
2.1 (2)

62.1 (82)
37.9 (50)
60.4 (81)
39.6 (53)

37.8 (14)
62.2 (23)
68.4 (26)
31.6 (12)

t or χ 2

p

3.66

.301

-1

.001

-1

.248

.190

.910

5.60

.061

-1

.687

71.6 (68)
28.4 (27)
57.3 (55)
42.7 (41)

76.0 (95)
9.6 (12)
14.4 (18)

78.4 (29)
8.1 (3)
13.5 (5)

75.0 (66)
10.2 (9)
14.8 (13)

54.5 (73)
26.9 (36)
18.7 (25)

68.4 (26)
13.2 (5)
18.4 (7)

49.0 (47)
32.3 (31)
18.8 (18)

40.7 (50)
59.3 (73)

37.1 (13)
62.9 (22)

42.0 (37)
58.0 (51)

32.1 (43)
36.6 (49)
34.4 (45)

26.3 (10)
44.7 (17)
55.3 (21)

34.4 (33)
33.3 (32)
25.8 (24)

-1
1.526
10.38

.417
.217
.001

45.9 (61)

57.9 (22)

41.1 (39)

-1

.086

75.4 (101)
49.3 (66)
53.8 (70)
38.1 (45)

81.6 (31)
50.0 (19)
22.2 (8)
20.6 (7)

72.9 (70)
49.0 (47)
66.0 (62)
45.2 (38)

-1
.012
34.47
13.18

.367
.913
.000
.004
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Specific Psychiatric
Diagnosis
Developmental Delay
Mental Retardation
ADHD
Other Behav./Conduct
Disorder
Psychotic Disorder
Mood Disorder
Developmental Disorder
PTSD
Personality Disorder
Court
Court Type
Juvenile
GA (Part B)
JD (Part A)

21.6 (29)
33.6 (45)
26.1 (35)
22.4 (30)

34.2 (13)
31.6 (12)
42.1 (16)
36.8 (14)

16.7 (16)
34.4 (33)
19.8 (19)
16.7 (16)

4.94
-1
7.02
6.38

.026
.841
.008
.012

25.4 (34)
21.6 (29)
11.9 (16)
4.5 (6)
3.0 (4)

18.4 (7)
28.9 (11)
23.7 (9)
10.5 (4)
2.6 (1)

28.1 (27)
18.8 (18)
7.3 (7)
2.1 (2)
3.1 (3)

-1
1.67
6.96
4.54
-1

.279
.196
.008
.033
1.0

105.6

.000

23.1 (31)
61.2 (82)
15.7 (21)

81.6 (31)
5.3 (2)
13.2 (5)

0.0 (0)
83.3 (80)
16.7 (16)
-1

.014

t = -4.403

.000

.173

.677

10.27

.036

6.17

.013

.001

.976

Attorney Type
Public Defender
Private Attorney

84.7 (111)
15.3 (20)

97.2 (35)
2.8 (1)

80.0 (76)
20.0 (19)

Charges
Number of Charges

4.92 (3.98)

3.13 (2.21)

5.63 (4.30)

76.1 (102)
23.9 (32)

73.7 (28)
26.3 (10)

77.1 (74)
22.9 (22)

Most Serious Charge Type
Felony
Misdemeanor
Crime Type for Most Serious
Charge
Drug
Justice
Person
Property
Weapon

14.9 (20)
11.9 (16)
56.0 (75)
11.9 (16)
5.2 (7)

0.0 (0)
13.2 (5)
68.4 (26)
10.5 (4)
7.9 (3)

20.8 (20)
11.5 (11)
51.0 (49)
12.5 (12)
4.2 (4)

Prior Arrests

65.2 (86)

48.6 (18)

71.6 (68)

62.4 (83)
36.1 (48)

63.2 (24)
36.8 (14)

63.4 (59)
36.6 (34)

Competency, Court's Decision
Competent
Incompetent

∗

1

The percentages shown are valid percentages, taking into consideration missing data.
A Fisher’s Exact test was used.
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Appendix B
Table 2. Comparison between Competent and Incompetent Overall

Characteristic
Age
Race
African American
Hispanic
Caucasian
Other
Education
Current School Level
Delayed
Appropriate
Receipt of Special Services
Receiving special services
Not receiving special services

Incompetent
n = 48
%∗ (n) or
mean (s.d.)
16.21 (2.13)

Competent
n = 83
%∗∗ (n) or
mean (s.d.)
15.99 (1.98)

38.3 (18)
37.8 (17)
32.4 (12)
50.0 (1)

61.7 (29)
62.2 (28)
67.6 (25)
50.0 (1)

43.8 (35)
26.0 (13)

t or χ 2
t = .596
.517

p
.552
.915

-1

.061

-1

.096

1.81

.405

.050

.975

3.97

.046

56.3 (45)
74.0 (37)

42.5 (34)
27.5 (14)

57.5 (46)
72.5 (37)

40.2 (39)
25.0 (3)
27.8 (5)

59.8 (55)
75.0 (9)
72.2 (13)

Out of Home Placements
None
One
Greater than One

36.1 (26)
38.2 (13)
36.0 (9)

63.9 (46)
61.8 (21)
64.0 (16)

Father’s Presence in Home
Father is present in home
Father not present in home

49.0 (24)
31.0 (22)

51.0 (25)
69.0 (49)

37.2 (16)
41.7 (20)
33.3 (15)
44.3 (27)

62.8 (27)
58.3 (28)
66.7 (30)
55.7 (34)

.009
.824
-1
-1

.925
.364
.847
.099

History
Prior Psychiatric History
Prior Hospitalizations
Substance Abuse History
Alcohol Abuse History

36.4 (36)
35.9 (23)
33.8 (23)
31.1 (14)

63.6 (63)
64.1 (41)
66.2 (45)
68.9 (31)

.013
-1
.813
3.11

.908
1.0
.666
.376

Specific Psychiatric Diagnosis
Developmental Delay
Mental Retardation
ADHD

50.0 (14)
45.5 (20)
31.4 (11)

50.0 (14)
54.5 (24)
68.6 (24)

2.74
2.22
-1

.098
.137
.541

Family Structure History
Living with:
Parent(s)
Extended Family
Other

Mental Health
No Diagnosis
Multiple Diagnoses
Receiving Treatment at time of arrest
Taking Medication
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Other Behav./Conduct Disorder
Psychotic Disorder
Mood Disorder
Developmental Disorder
PTSD
Personality Disorder
Court
Court Type
Juvenile
GA (Part B)
JD (Part A)
Attorney Type
Public Defender
Private Attorney

41.9 (13)
39.2 (31)
19.0 (4)

58.1 (18)
60.8 (48)
81.0 (17)

-1
4.96
-1
1.40
-1
-1

.830
.026
.077
.237
1.0
1.0

3.40

.182

-1

.616

t = 1.01

.315

.075

.784

.608

.962

61.5 (67)
70.0 (14)

4.44 (3.96)

5.17 (4.02)

Most Serious Charge Type
Felony
Misdemeanor

36.0 (36)
38.7 (12)

64.0 (64)
61.3 (19)

Crime Type for Most Serious Charge
Drug
Justice
Person
Property
Weapon

36.8 (7)
43.8 (7)
35.1 (26)
33.3 (5)
42.9 (3)

63.2 (12)
56.3 (9)
64.9 (48)
66.7 (10)
57.1 (4)

Prior Arrests

37.3 (31)

62.7 (52)

-1

1.0

14.6 (14)
21.0 (21)
24.3 (26)
16.8 (16)
12.1 (11)
25.9 (14)
4.9 (4)
12.1 (7)

85.4 (82)
79.0 (79)
75.7 (87)
83.2 (79)
87.9 (80)
74.1 (4)
95.1 (78)
87.9 (51)

-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
1.49
-1
25.8

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.223
.000
.000

14.8 (13)

85.2 (75)

-1

.000

Comprehension
Knowledge of Charges
Knowledge of Judge’s Role
Knowledge of Attorney’s Role
Knowledge of Prosecutor’s Role
Knowledge of Relevant Pleas
Knows Attorney’s Name
Knows How to Use Attorney
Accurately Estimates Potential
Consequences
Can Tell a Coherent Story

1

66.7 (20)
46.9 (15)
78.6 (22)
50.0 (8)
66.7 (4)
75.0 (3)

38.5 (42)
30.0 (6)

Charges
Number of Charges

∗

33.3 (10)
53.1 (17)
21.4 (6)
50.0 (8)
33.3 (2)
25.0 (1)

The percentages shown are valid percentages, taking into consideration missing data.
A Fisher’s Exact test was used.
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Appendix C
Table 3. Comparison between Competent and Incompetent, Ages 10-15

Characteristic
Age
Race
African American
Hispanic
Caucasian
Other

Ages 10-15
Incompetent
Competent
n = 14
n = 24
%∗ (n) or
%∗ (n) or
mean (s.d.)
mean (s.d.)
13.29 (1.54)
13.33 (1.52)

t or χ 2

p

1.09

.579

.357

.059

.175

.675

3.67

.159

1.15

.563

.326

.568

40.0 (4)
43.8 (7)
25.0 (3)
0.0 (0)

60.0 (6)
56.3 (9)
75.0 (9)
0.0 (0)

57.1 (8)
26.1 (6)

42.9 (6)
73.9 (17)

34.6 (9)
41.7 (5)

65.4 (17)
58.3 (7)

44.8 (13)
33.3 (1)
0.0 (0)

55.2 (16)
66.7 (2)
100 (5)

Out of Home Placements
None
One
Greater than One

42.3 (11)
20.0 (1)
28.6 (2)

57.7 (15)
80.0 (4)
71.4 (5)

Father’s Presence in Home
Father is present in home
Father not present in home

46.2 (6)
36.4 (8)

53.8 (7)
63.6 (14)

50.0 (5)
47.1 (8)
33.3 (7)
36.4 (8)

50.0 (5)
52.9 (9)
66.7 (14)
63.6 (14)

1.01
-1
.248
.005

.315
.318
.618
.943

32.3 (10)
36.8 (7)
25.0 (2)
28.6 (2)

67.7 (21)
63.2 (12)
75.0 (6)
71.4 (5)

1.52
.000
1.99
.427

.218
1.0
.369
.808

Education
Current School Level
Delayed
Appropriate
Receipt of Special Services
Receiving special services
Not receiving special services
Family Structure History
Living with:
Parent(s)
Extended Family
Other

Mental Health
No Diagnosis
Multiple Diagnoses
Receiving Treatment at time of arrest
Taking Medication
History
Psychiatric History
Prior Hospitalizations
Substance Abuse History
Alcohol Abuse History
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Specific Psychiatric Diagnosis
Developmental Delay
Mental Retardation
ADHD
Other Behav./Conduct Disorder
Psychotic Disorder
Mood Disorder
Developmental Disorder
PTSD
Personality Disorder
Court
Court Type
Juvenile
GA (Part B)
JD (Part A)
Attorney Type
Public Defender
Private Attorney
Charges
Number of Charges

1

69.2 (9)
58.3 (7)
81.3 (13)
71.4 (10)
42.9 (3)
63.6 (7)
55.6 (5)
50.0 (2)
0.0 (0)

41.9 (13)
0.0 (0)
20.0 (1)

58.1 (18)
100.0 (2)
80.0 (4)

40.0 (14)
0.0 (0)

60.0 (21)
100.0 (1)

2.50 (1.29)

3.50 (2.55)

-1
.175
-1
-1
1.52
-1
.293
.333
-1

.728
.675
.088
.501
.218
1.0
.588
.564
.368

2.12

.346

-1

1.00

t = 1.602

.118

-1

.715

2.03

.567

Most Serious Charge Type
Felony
Misdemeanor

39.3 (11)
30.0 (3)

60.7 (17)
70.0 (7)

Crime Type for Most Serious Charge
Drug
Justice
Person
Property
Weapon

0.0 (0)
20.0 (1)
38.5 (10)
25.0 (1)
66.7 (2)

0.0 (0)
80.0 (4)
61.5 (16)
75.0 (3)
33.3 (1)

Prior Arrests

38.9 (7)

61.1 (11)

.016

.898

17.9 (5)
25.0 (7)
26.7 (8)
16.7 (4)
12.5 (3)
38.5 (5)
4.5 (1)
0.0 (0)

82.1 (23)
75.0 (21)
73.3 (22)
83.3 (20)
87.5 (21)
61.5 (8)
95.5 (21)
100.0 (12)

-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
13.24

.000
.014
.034
.001
.000
.666
.000
.001

18.2 (4)

81.8 (18)

-1

.001

Comprehension
Knowledge of Charges
Knowledge of Judge’s Role
Knowledge of Attorney’s Role
Knowledge of Prosecutor’s Role
Knowledge of Relevant Pleas
Knows Attorney’s Name
Knows How to Use Attorney
Accurately Estimates Potential
Consequences
Can Tell a Coherent Story

∗

30.8 (4)
41.7 (5)
18.8 (3)
28.6 (4)
57.1 (4)
36.4 (4)
44.4 (4)
50.0 (2)
100.0 (1)

The percentages shown are valid percentages, taking into consideration missing data.
A Fisher’s Exact test was used.
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Appendix D
Table 4. Comparison between Competent and Incompetent Ages 16-18

Characteristic
Age
Race
African American
Hispanic
Caucasian
Other
Education
Current School Level
Delayed
Appropriate
Receipt of Special Services
Receiving special services
Not receiving special services

Ages 16-18
Incompetent
Competent
n = 34
n = 59
%∗ (n) or
%∗ (n) or
mean (s.d.)
mean (s.d.)
17.41 (.657)
17.07 (.740)
37.8 (14)
34.5 (1)
36.0 (9)
50.0 (1)

40.9 (27)
25.9 (7)

t or χ 2

p

.239

.971

-1

.237

-1

.029

.883

.643

.642

.725

4.06

.044

62.2 (23)
65.5 (19)
64.0 (16)
50.0 (1)

59.1 (39)
74.1 (20)

46.3 (25)
23.1 (9)

53.7 (29)
76.9 (30)

38.1 (24)
22.2 (2)
38.5 (5)

61.9 (39)
77.8 (7)
61.5 (8)

Out of Home Placements
None
One
Greater than One

32.6 (15)
41.4 (12)
38.9 (7)

67.4 (31)
58.6 (17)
61.1 (11)

Father’s Presence in Home
Father is present in home
Father not present in home

50.0 (18)
28.6 (14)

50.0 (18)
71.4 (35)

33.3 (11)
38.7 (12)
33.3 (8)
48.7 (19)

66.7 (22)
61.3 (19)
66.7 (16)
51.3 (20)

33.3 (11)
.093
.018
4.858

.660
.761
.894
.028

38.2 (26)
35.6 (16)
35.0 (21)
31.6 (12)

61.8 (42)
64.4 (29)
65.0 (39)
68.4 (26)

-1
-1
.061
3.11

.635
1.0
.970
.375

Family Structure History
Living with:
Parent(s)
Extended Family
Other

Mental Health
No Diagnosis
Multiple Diagnoses
Receiving Treatment at time of arrest
Taking Medication
History
Psychiatric History
Prior Hospitalizations
Substance Abuse History
Alcohol Abuse History
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Specific Psychiatric Diagnosis
Developmental Delay
Mental Retardation
ADHD
Other Behav. Disorder
Psychotic Disorder
Mood Disorder
Developmental Disorder
PTSD
Personality Disorder
Court
Court Type
Juvenile
GA (Part B)
JD (Part A)
Attorney Type
Public Defender
Private Attorney
Charges
Number of Charges
Most Serious Charge Type
Felony
Misdemeanor

1

0.0 (0)
40.3 (31)
18.8 (3)

33.3 (5)
53.1 (17)
57.9 (11)
62.5 (10)
48.0 (12)
88.2 (15)
42.9 (3)
100.0 (2)
100.0 (3)

-1
2.24
.317
.007
3.52
-1
1.38
-1
-1

.017
.135
.574
.932
.061
.025
.240
.531
.297

-1

.104

-1

.791

t = .654

.515

.464

.496

1.98

.739

0.0 (0)
59.7 (46)
81.3 (13)

37.8 (28)
31.6 (6)

62.2 (46)
68.4 (13)

5.24 (4.40)

5.85 (4.32)

34.7 (25)
42.9 (9)

65.3 (47)
57.1 (12)

Type of Crime for Most Serious
Charge
Drug
Justice
Person
Property
Weapon

36.8 (7)
54.5 (6)
33.3 (16)
36.4 (4)
25.0 (1)

63.2 (12)
45.5 (5)
66.7 (32)
63.6 (7)
75.0 (3)

Prior Arrests

36.9 (24)

63.1 (41)

.000

.992

13.2 (9)
19.4 (14)
23.4 (18)
16.9 (12)
11.9 (8)
22.0 (9)
5.0 (3)
15.2 (7)

86.8 (59)
80.6 (58)
76.6 (59)
83.1 (59)
88.1 (59)
78.0 (32)
95.0 (57)
84.8 (39)

-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
.820
-1
13.89

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.365
.000
.001

13.6 (9)

86.4 (57)

-1

.000

Comprehension
Knowledge of Charges
Knowledge of Judge’s Role
Knowledge of Attorney’s Role
Knowledge of Prosecutor’s Role
Knowledge of Relevant Pleas
Knows Attorney’s Name
Knows How to Use Attorney
Accurately Estimates Potential
Consequences
Can Tell a Coherent Story

∗

66.7 (10)
46.9 (15)
42.1 (8)
37.5 (6)
52.0 (13)
11.8 (2)
57.1 (4)
0.0 (0)
0.0 (0)

The percentages shown are valid percentages, taking into consideration missing data.
A Fisher’s Exact test was used.
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